Abstract
This section summarizes the main foreign opinions on the Belt and Road Initiative. The author organizes these into: one "inequality" between China and its Partners; three goals that China wants to achieve; two ways in which China wants to create domestic stability. These opinions focus on the goal of the Belt and Road Initiative and the ways to implement it.
One "inequality" between China and its partners
The imparity of the Belt and Road Initiative is the "inequality" in the relationships between China and its partners, that is, the "inequality" of the market. According to this opinion, many countries still suffer from the financial crisis and/or with the refugee crisis, which leads to the slow recovery of their economy. China needs to upgrade its industries and enlarge the market for its products through a great number of mergers and acquisitions, under the name of the Belt and Road Initiative. This process can easily open the internal market of another country to China. On the other hand, when these countries enter the Chinese market, they cannot do so effectively, due to the complicated situation in China, despite the fact that Chinese markets are more open than before.
3 Foreign countries urge China to reduce the limitations to market access and improve intellectual property rights protection. Public procurement especially needs to be open to foreign companies. For foreign countries, the best way to achieve this is to sign an investment protection agreement with the Chinese central or local government (Brockova and Gress 2016) .
Moreover, the form of Chinese investment cannot meet its partners' needs. Nowadays, Chinese investment is merger and acquisition- BT investment can maybe improve local infrastructure, but the future owner will face more risk.
These phenomena cause the impression that China wants to use the Belt and Road Initiative to maintain and enlarge the openness of others' markets to its investment and products, but at the same time, close or tighten the openness of its own market to foreigners, especially in the areas of finance, construction or communication. For those of this opinion, it means China does not want to sincerely cooperate with others when it initiated the Belt and Road project.
Three goals that China wants to achieve
The three goals that China wants to achieve are widely considered as the direct goals of the Belt and Road Initiative. This perception holds the view that the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative will directly serve the reconstruction of world order. It is also a strengthening and active signal of Xi's foreign policy in order to create a stable international environment.
Nowadays, China promotes relations both eastward and westward.
Eastward, China promotes relations with the USA; Westward, China enhances cooperation with Eurasian countries through the Belt and Road
Initiative, especially with Germany and Russia. If these countries maintain cooperation with China, then China will avoid many difficulties during its development (Weissmann 2015 banks try to hide large-scale bad debts (Rudzki 2016 is a very dangerous tool with which to achieve a goal (Sørensen 2015) .
The second way China might achieve domestic stability is through the Chinese government's strong role in many aspects of daily life. China uses the Belt and Road Initiative to enhance the government's effect on the economy and capacity production. Some say the Chinese government repeatedly stresses its decisive role, rather than basic role, which means government intervention will continue. Like in Chinese investment in other countries, state-owned companies play a central role. Under the capacity production cooperation plan, the Chinese government is also the main stimulator. Domestically, China uses the Belt and Road Initiative to link the provinces to the central government. Local governments try every means to define their role in the Belt and Road Initiative and boost their reputation, to get more attention from the central government. 6 However, the pessimists hold that the efficiency of intervention is low, which sets back economic innovation and the market economy. For foreign investors, it is an uncertain signal with which to predict the direction of the Chinese economy.
In short, foreign opinions on the Belt and Road Initiative are not just limited to the initiative itself, but broadened to include speculation on the Chinese domestic market, its economic situation, its domestic stabilization and China's political ambition in the world. Additionally, the above views are not just limited to the quoted materials, they always occur during conferences, seminars, and interviews with some government officials or scholars.
The root of the perceptions of China and its partners towards the Belt and Road Initiative
The difference in the overall condition of the two sides
The "inequality" of the market is the first thing that the two sides understand differently, and it is often mentioned at every occasion about the Belt and Road. However, it is rooted in the different need and condition of the two sides.
For China, on one hand, its industries face the problems of overcapacity and low added-value, which hinders the Chinese economy. Although
Chinese GDP is now increasing slowly, according to official data, these real structural problems are unsolved. It is an urgent task for China, and its biggest need. On the other hand, since the global financial crisis hightech enterprises, mainly in Europe and the USA, are suffering from a break of the capital chain, and at the same time Chinese enterprises are waiting to upgrade themselves, with a lot of money seeking investment. This is, to an extent, a historical coincidence. From this point of view, China did not "invade" or "buy" Europe. China is just acting according to the current situation and is taking advantage of historical opportunities.
As for the method of investment, Chinese sides need to learn technological skills and produce higher added-value products as soon as possible. So, generally speaking, mergers and acquisitions are the fastest way to achieve this goal, which is a reasonable and lawful way all over the world, except for some certain areas which involve national security. Besides, Chinese enterprises will face unfamiliar regulations and markets just as foreign enterprises face in China, especially regarding the process of investment to the upper section of the industrial chain. This is unlike big western groups, who just invest in the lower part of the industrial chain, to find low-cost labor. So for the Chinese side, they will face more risk. Under this situation, mergers and acquisitions are also the safest way. To avoid risk is the common concern of companies worldwide. So we can see that the Chinese need to upgrade is not different from the needs of other companies, and its way of seeking opportunities is also common in the field of business. The USA also invested a lot and bought a lot of European companies during the financial crisis (EY report 2015). It seems that it did not catch as much attention as China did. In fact, the author thinks that the method of investment is not the real concern for European and other partners. Rather, what is of concern is a Chinese industrial upgrade by one big leap, which means China does not need to go step by step, and can just go directly from 2.0 to 4.0 through mergers and acquisitions.
Foreign partners all seek protection of knowledge, know-how, technology, and investment from the Chinese government, due to its complicated market and lack of related regulation. Or they urge China to increase its agricultural quota for imports. These are the main complaints when they come to China. It is true that the Chinese market is not so transparent or regulated as the European one, and the supervision of the quotas on agricultural products is strict and time-consuming. However, China is improving its market environment and foreign partners cannot take
China as a mono-natured market. In the southern part of China, the trade environment and the government is more open. The market is more regulated and policies are more transparent, since this part of China was the pilot for the Chinese private economy during the "Reform and Open" era. Consumers there are also very open to new products. Contrary to that, the north-eastern part of China is more closed since they are still suffering from overcapacity of their industries, which was deeply influenced by the former Soviet Union style economy. In this part of China people and government are more closed, even to the Chinese themselves. The western part of China is now developing very fast with the support of the government, since it is an important part of the Belt and Road. So the Chinese market is large and divergent, and not in total chaos as foreign partners imagine it. As for the agricultural quotas, this is hard to get from the Ministry and State Quality Inspection Administration. Partly, this is because the paperwork and bureaucracy in these bodies is complicated and time-consuming. Partly, this is because of the small amount of agricultural products from foreign countries that enter the Chinese market.
The Chinese population is large, and a small amount of product cannot even meet the needs of market promotion, and the administration is not willing to go through complicated and time-consuming procedures for a small quantity of products. This phenomenon is more common in Central and Eastern Europe. Many high-quality agricultural products from the CEE cannot enter the Chinese market, not because of quality, but because of quantity, which does not arouse the interest of the Ministry and State Quality Inspection Administration. This is why Poland and other countries always complain about a trade deficit with China. So it is the different internal conditions of China and its partners that causes the "inequality" of the market, and some misunderstanding about Chinese market.
The perceptions of great powers
The second feature of foreign opinion are the perceptions of the great powers. They consider China as a global and regional great power. This is the root of the view that the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative will directly serve the reconstruction of world order and the creation of a stable international environment and multi-polar world. Their logic is that China must be a great power now, and therefore China is capable of changing the current world order and definitely will change it. This logic, to most The Belt and Road Initiative is the tool that China chooses to utilize. To them, China's goal is legitimacy in the international economic order, and the support, or less interference on sensitive issues, from the EU. However, these goals are just in the imagination of China's foreign partners. They are neither realistic, nor appropriate for today's China.
China is indeed rising in the world, which will draw global attention. But at the same time, China is weak due to many structural problems. The rise of China is different from the time of the USA's rise, or Germany's rise.
So for China, the essential principle is that it should rise peacefully, which means it should not cause problems with other countries. As mentioned above, China's final goal of the Belt and Road Initiative is to solve domestic problems, which means China knows itself well, and knows its weakness, so it will not put a global rise in the world as a priority, it just seeks a reasonable place in today's world. From this point of view, the New 
The combination of domestic needs and foreign policy
The third feature of foreign opinion is the combination of domestic needs and foreign policy. In fact, this can hardly be considered as a different perception between China and its partners, since foreign partners exactly understand this as the point of Chinese foreign policy.
A popular Chinese political phrase is that we should combine two policies, the domestic and international. However China, and also shows an inclusive attitude towards minorities. So discrimination, or other western-style nationalisms is rare in China.
However, the author cannot deny that indeed there are some cases of discrimination.
As for the Chinese government's role, the author thinks that it is very helpful to the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. The author even judges that without the strong role of government, the Belt and Road Initiative cannot be implemented smoothly. As we all know, the main feature of the Belt and Road Initiative is infrastructure projects, since China has much more experience in this area. It is hard to profit from these kinds of projects in the short term due to large initial costs. It is more like a social welfare project, rather than a pure marketoriented project like food trade. So, we cannot expect many private companies to invest in projects like this, the only way is for government or state-owned companies to get involved. Only these actors can focus on long-term profit, and are capable of handling a long capital chain. Besides, investing in another country is a risk. For Chinese private companies, especially under the current situation, they can hardly take risks, and they are not familiar with foreign laws, environments, and markets. Compare that situation with Europe, where it is easy for a German company to invest in Hungary, because they are both EU Member States, they are familiar with each other's laws and have had contact for centuries. That is the biggest weakness of Chinese investment. Under these circumstances, private companies will think it over and over again to avoid risks before investing. If the main Chinese actors of the Belt and Road Initiative are private companies, then this initiative cannot be implemented so fast and broadly. Or maybe, at that time, foreign partners will criticize the Chinese side as an unreliable partner, because the Chinese (private companies) would always want to find the most profitable projects. With these criticisms, how could China learn high-tech and management skills from the outside?
The role of the government is also another guarantee for the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. Contrary to foreign opinions on the role of the government as a low-efficiency phenomenon, it is a highly efficient actor. Take the process of railway construction, for example. In China, if the government plans to build a railway between two long-distance cities, which passes through several provinces, then central government will gather the heads of these provinces and formulate a plan, then assign tasks to these provinces. When a section of the railway is finished, all they need is a connection, the whole thing China will subsidize imports from Poland, the trade deficit will improve, but
China will be faced with more critics. Secondly, the author has said in the second part of the paper that the mode of investment of mergers and acquisitions is much safer for Chinese to invest in. by China as ideological ones, and their conclusion therefore is that of growing Chinese geopolitical ambition. They cannot split Chinese ideology and government policy, including in the Belt and Road Initiative, and 16+1 cooperation. Here is the paradox, if China chose to take part in the Ukraine crisis, or the Syria crisis, and condemn Russia, the USA or the EU, international society will definitely perceive this choice as a manifestation of ideologically charged Chinese geopolitical ambition.
The third paradox is about efficiency and the Chinese way of cooperation.
The Chinese way is government-oriented. The government drives stateowned companies and its policies drive people. In China, a high-level official visit is the most important thing that can happen to a region. It is even a signal to businesses and an opportunity for cultural exchange. This is the impression of western countries to China. But the western way is totally different, where the influence of government is less. All of these factors make Western countries think that the Chinese way of cooperation is hard to accept, since big companies are backed by Chinese government and not driven by the market. However, as the author mentioned above, Chinese government-led cooperation is highly efficient and short-term profit is not the main focus of this kind of cooperation. So, this is the main worry of Western countries but, at the same time, the biggest advantage of cooperation with China. If the body of cooperation is private enterprise, which concentrates on short-term profit, it can hardly invest in a power plant, highway, railway and so on, of course, except for several big multinational groups. If left to private companies, then the whole of the Belt and Road Initiative and 16+1 cooperation will never come to fruition.
Under such circumstances, efficiency is low and foreign partners will complain more about the Chinese side. This is the third paradox, the role of Chinese government and the method of cooperation in the western imagination.
These paradoxes are the problems which, it seems, cannot be solved.
According to the author's opinion, they are deeply rooted in the definition of "development". In China, economic development, the material improvement of people's lives is the first priority in "development".
If people's lives improve and its economy blooms, all problems will be solved. However, in European countries, or in the western way, economic development is just part of "development". Human rights, democratic reform, and other related issues should be developed at the same time.
Economic development does not necessarily bring about improvement in these areas. That is why China intends to focus on pragmatic cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative and 16+1 cooperation, but its partners criticize the Chinese on other issues not related to pragmatic cooperation.
In the future, how the two sides perceive each other's ways of thinking is the biggest challenge on the Belt and Road Initiative and 16+1 cooperation.
